direct opposition to the vocal concerns of Human Rights repeatedly expressed throughout your administration. I am even more disappointed at the lack of sensitivity exhibited by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to minority rights. To be more specific, the U.S. Commission has consistently ignored input from State Advisory Committees and particularly the concerns of small states with small minority populations where conditions are frequently appalling. In the event that a Regional Advisory Committee is established States like Oklahoma, which incidentally has the largest Native American Population, will virtually have no input in Region VI. At least with a State Advisory Committee we could focus on problems that are unique to the region (6.5% Black population, 3.1% Native American and -2% Hispanic). It is definitely not in the best interest of Civil Rights to establish an organization that is farther removed from the state and local levels. This has been the uniqueness of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. Many of us have served because of our commitment to Civil Rights and it is most depressing to see a functioning part of government changed to a structure that is at best questionable. It was 101 years ago that many gains made by Blacks after the Civil War were lost as the people were abandoned by the group (party) which they had supported. Those of us who have been involved at the local level know that it is the continued follow-up of State Advisory Committees that begins to make the initial change more permanent because we know that people who have been taught certain practices require a longer period to adjust and become more sensitive. I would request that you and Mr. Wayne Granquist of the OMB meet with the SAC chairpersons or a representative group at the earliest possible date to discuss the role of State Advisory Committees have played in advancing human rights. Respectfully yours, EARL D. MITCHELL, JR., PH.D., Hon. BIRCH BAYH, PITTSBURGH, PA., April 28, 1978. Chairperson, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR BAYH: Thanks for sending the copy of "Committee Print #4 to S. 2300," the latest proposed amended version of the bill to extend the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, along with your April 4 request for additional information on S. 2300 itself. At that time I responded to your questions about whether State Advisory Committees were involved in the development of the Commission proposal for regional SACs, but I did not react to your request for my opinion of the new (Section 5) language which mandates State Advisory Committees and also authorizes to the Commission to charter other advisory committees within states if needed. I prefer the directness of the language of S. 2300's counterpart bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 10831, Sec. 5, Section 105 (c), on line 10 of page 3, and which is attached.1 Nevertheless, I can support the S. 2300 SAC language in Committee Print #4, despite the fact that it is cumbersome to the extent of seeming ambiguous about State Advisory Committees. In expressing such support, I trust that the cumbersome language is not intended to further complicate the Commission's advisory structure, supercede present SACS with other advisory committees within the confines of particular states, or set up competing advisory structures within states. As a member of Pennsylvania's State Advisory Committee, I ask that you communicate my qualified support for "Committee Print #4," to your Subcommittee and the full Committee on the Judiciary, especially should attempts to alter the language be made. Please know that I will communicate similarly on this matter, as I have in the past, to Pennsylvania Senators H. John Heinz III and Richard Schweiker. I would appreciate keeping apprised of the progress and any changes in S. 2300 as it moves toward the full Senate. It is possible Ben Dixon could manage this? Thank you for the time you have already given to the matter of the Commis 1 Sec. 5. Section 105 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (42 U.S.C. 1975d (c); 71 Stat. 636) is amended by striking out the word "may" the first time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof the word "shall". sion's State Advisory Committees. Those of us attempting to protect and advance civil rights through these and other structures appreciate this. We are hopeful that the Congress will see fit to assure the continuance of State Advisory Committees through the next five-year tenure of the Commission. Sincerely yours, ELIZABETH WOLFSKILL. PART 5.-MATERIAL ON DENVER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLO. 189 Syllabus KEYES ET AL. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT No. 71-507. Argued October 12, 1972-Decided June 21, 1973 Petitioners sought desegregation of the Park Hill area schools in Denver and, upon securing an order of the District Court directing that relief, expanded their suit to secure desegregation of the remaining schools of the Denver school district, particularly those in the core city area. The District Court denied the further relief, holding that the deliberate racial segregation of the Park Hill schools did not prove a like segregation policy addressed specifically to the core city schools and requiring petitioners to prove de jure segregation for each area that they sought to have desegregated. That court nevertheless found that the segregated core city schools were educationally inferior to "white" schools elsewhere in the district and, relying on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, ordered the respondents to provide substantially equal facilities for those schools. This latter relief was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Park Hill ruling and agreed that Park Hill segregation, even though deliberate, proved nothing regarding an overall policy of segregation. Held: 1. The District Court, for purposes of defining a "segregated" core city school, erred in not placing Negroes and Hispanos in the same category since both groups suffer the same educational inequities when compared with the treatment afforded Anglo students. Pp. 195–198. 2. The courts below did not apply the correct legal standard in dealing with petitioners' contention that respondent School Board had the policy of deliberately segregating the core city schools. Pp. 198-213. (a) Proof that the school authorities have pursued an intentional segregative policy in a substantial portion of the school district will support a finding by the trial court of the existence of a dual system, absent a showing that the district is divided into clearly unrelated units. Pp. 201-203. (b) On remand the District Court should decide initially whether respondent School Board's deliberately segregative policy 190 OCTOBER TERM, 1972 Syllabus 413 U.S. respecting the Park Hill schools constitutes the whole Denver school district a dual school system. Pp. 204-205. (c) Where, as in this case, a policy of intentional segregation has been proved with respect to a significant portion of the school system, the burden is on the school authorities (regardless of claims that their "neighborhood school policy" was racially neutral) to prove that their actions as to other segregated schools in the system were not likewise motivated by a segregative intent. Pp. 207-213. 445 F. 2d 990, modified and remanded. BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DoUGLAS, STEWART, MARSHALL, and BLACK MUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a separate opinion, post, p. 214. BURGER, C. J., concurred in the result. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 217. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 254. WHITE, J., took no part in the decision of the case. James M. Nabrit III and Gordon G. Greiner argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief were Jack Greenberg, Charles Stephen Ralston, Norman J. Chachkin, Robert T. Connery, and Anthony G. Amsterdam. William K. Ris argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Thomas E. Creighton, Benjamin L. Craig, and Michael H. Jackson.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Melvin L. Wulf, Sanford Jay Rosen, and Edwin S. Kahn for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Stephen J. Pollak, Richard M. Sharp, David Rubin, Larry F. Hobbs, and Leonard N. Waldbaum for the National Education Association et al.; by Arnold Forster, Paul Hartman, Paul S. Berger, Joseph B. Robison, and Samuel Rabinove for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et al.; and by Mario G. Obledo and Michael Mendelson for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wendell C. Hamacher, Deputy Attorney General, and William F. Harvey for the State of Indiana; by 189 KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLO. 191 Opinion of the Court MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. This school desegregation case concerns the Denver, Colorado, school system. That system has never been operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that mandated or permitted racial segregation in public education. Rather, the gravamen of this action, brought in June 1969 in the District Court for the District of Colorado by parents of Denver schoolchildren, is that respondent School Board alone, by use of various techniques such as the manipulation of student attendance zones, schoolsite selection and a neighborhood school policy, created or maintained racially or ethnically (or both racially and ethnically) segregated schools throughout the school district, entitling petitioners to a decree directing desegregation of the entire school district. The boundaries of the school district are coterminous with the boundaries of the city and county of Denver. There were in 1969, 119 schools with 96,580 pupils Thomas A. Shannon, Donald R. Lincoln, and Paul D. Engstrand for San Diego Unified School District; and by Willis Hannawalt and Vivian Hannawalt for Robert G. Nelson et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Norman, James P. Turner, Brian K. Landsberg, and Thomas M. Keeling for the United States, and by David I. Caplan for the Jewish Rights Council, Inc. To the contrary, Art. IX, §8, of the Colorado Constitution expressly prohibits any "classification of pupils . . . on account of race or color." As early as 1927, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a Denver practice of excluding black students from school programs at Manual High School and Morey Junior High School violated state law. Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 P. 386. There were 92 elementary schools, 15 junior high schools, 2 juniorsenior high schools, and 7 senior high schools. In addition, the Board operates an Opportunity School, a Metropolitan Youth Education Center, and an Aircraft Training Facility. |
