BOOK I. To Mr HENRY HOME. "June 13. 1742. 66 I agree with you, that Cicero's reasonings in his Orations are very often loose, and what we should think to be wandering 66 66 "order to make a company apart; but no one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm which beats upon me from "every side. I have exposed myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, "logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at the "insults I must suffer? I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; "and can I be surprised if they should express a hatred of mine, and of my "person? When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradic. "tion, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and "contradict me; though such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions "loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of "others. Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection "makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning. For with what "confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprises, when, beside those num"berless infirmities peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to "human nature? Can I be sure that in leaving all established opinions, I am "following truth; and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if for"tune should at last guide me on her footsteps? After the most accurate "and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I should assent to it; "and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that "view, under which they appear to me."And a little after: "Expe"rience is a principle which makes us reason from causes and effects; and "'tis the same principle which convinces us of the continued existence of ex ❝ternal dering from the point; insomuch, that now-a-days a lawyer, who should give himself such liberties, would be in danger of meeting with a reprimand from the Judge, or at least N 2 of CHAP. III. 66 66 66 "ternal objects, when absent from the senses. But though these two opera❝tions be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some "circumstances they are directly contrary; nor is it possible for us to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe "the continued existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer "neither of them, but successively assent to both, as is usual among philosophers, with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title, “when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction? This contra"diction would be more excusable, were it compensated by any degree of solidity and satisfaction in the other parts of our reasoning. But the case is quite contrary. When we trace up the human understanding to its first principles, we find it to lead us into such sentiments as seem to turn into ri"dicule all our past pains and industry, and to discourage us from future in"quiries. Nothing is more curiously inquired after by the mind of man, than "the causes of every phenomenon; nor are we content with knowing the "immediate causes, but push on our inquiries till we arrive at the original "and ultimate principle. We would not willingly stop before we are ac"quainted with that energy in the cause by which it operates on its effect; "and how must we be disappointed, when we learn that this connection, tie, "or energy lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that determination of "the mind which is acquired by custom, and causes us to make a transition "from an object to its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the other? Such a discovery not only cuts off all hope of ever "attaining satisfaction, but even prevents our very wishes; since it appears, "that when we say we desire to know the ultimate and operating principle, BOOK I. of being admonished of the point in question. His Orations against Verres, however, are an exception; though that plunderer was so impudent and open in his robberies, that there is "as something which resides in the external object, we either contradict our"selves, or talk without a meaning.The intense view of these mani"fold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, " and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. "Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to "what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose 66 anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any "influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all "these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of "the use of every member and faculty." And is this the fruit of those boasted philosophical discoveries? this the only end to which the most penetrating intellect could employ its powers? this the final result of his laborious speculations? It is, by the philosopher's own confession. But observe the conclusion, and remark there the disclamation of those very opinions as pure chimeras, which, though he found his reason insufficient to dispel them, (reason thus sophisticated), were put to flight at once by his natural feelings, and the return of common sense. "Most for"tunately, (continues he), it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me "of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ❝of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which "obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I "converse, and am merry with my friends; and when, after three or four "hours How is the less merit in his conviction and condemnation. CHAP. III. "The "hours amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold "and strained and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter in"to them any farther."-Treatise of Human Nature, vol. i. p. 457. et seq. BOOK I. "The Orations for Marcellus and Ligarius, as also that for Archias, are very fine, and chiefly because the subjects do not require or admit of close reasoning. "Tis worth your while to read the conclusion of the Oration for Plancius, where I think the passions are very well touch'd. There are many noble passages in the Oration for Muræna, though 'tis certain that the prosecutors (who, however, were Servius, Sulpicius and Cato), must either have said nothing to the purpose, or Cicero has said nothing. There is some of that oration lost. ""Twould be a pleasure to you to read and compare the two first Philippics, that you may judge of the manners of those times, compared to modern manners. When Cicero spoke the first Philippic, Antony and he had not broke all measures with each other; but there were still some remains of a very great intimacy and friendship betwixt them: and besides, Cicero. lived in a close correspondence with all the rest of Cæsar's captains; Dolabella had been his son-in-law; Hirtius and Pansa were his pupils; Trebatius was entirely his creature. For this reason, prudence laid him under great restraints at that time in his declamations against Antony; there is great elegance and delicacy in them; and many of the thoughts are very fine, particularly where he mentions his meeting Brutus, who had been obliged to leave Rome: I was ashamed, says he, that I durst return to Rome after Brutus had left it, and that I could be in safety where he |
