MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion c Court. The respondent, Richard J. Mara, was subpoen appear before the September 1971 Grand Jury Northern District of Illinois that was investigating of interstate shipments. On two separate occasio was directed to produce handwriting and printing plars to the grand jury's designated agent. Each he was advised that he was a potential defendant matter under investigation. On both occasions fused to produce the exemplars. The Government then petitioned the United District Court to compel Mara to furnish the writing and printing exemplars to the grand jury petition indicated that the exemplars were "essent necessary" to the grand jury investigation and wo used solely as a standard of comparison to det whether Mara was the author of certain writings petition was accompanied by an affidavit of a agent, submitted in camera, which set forth the b seeking the exemplars. The District Judge rejec respondent's contention that the compelled pro of such exemplars would constitute an unrea search and seizure, and he ordered the respondent vide them. When the witness continued to r do so, he was adjudged to be in civil contempt committed to custody until he obeyed the cou or until the expiration of the grand jury term. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 1 454 F. 2d 580. Relying on its earlier decision Dionisio, 442 F. 2d 276, rev'd, ante, p. 1, t found that the directive to furnish the exempla constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. plain that compelling [Mara] to furnish exer his handwriting and printing is forbidden by th 2 410 U. S. he opinion of the was subpoenaed to Grand Jury in the nvestigating thefts arate occasions he nd printing exemagent. Each time 1 defendant in the occasions he re the United States respondent to pro- Amendment unless the Government has complie its reasonableness requirement...." 454 F. 2d, The court then turned to two issues necessaril erated by its decision in Dionisio-the procedu Government must follow and the substantive s it must make to establish the reasonableness grand jury's directive. It rejected the in camer cedure of the District Court, and held that the G ment would have to present its affidavit in oper in order that Mara might contest its sufficiency court ruled that to establish "reasonableness" th ernment would have to make a substantive sh "that the grand jury investigation was properly a ized, for a purpose Congress can order, that the mation sought is relevant to the inquiry, and th the grand jury process is not being abused. . . Government's affidavit must also show why satis handwriting and printing exemplars cannot be ob from other sources without grand jury compu 454 F. 2d, at 584-585. ... We granted certiorari, 406 U. S. 956, to consid case with United States v. Dionisio, No. 71-229 p. 1. We have held today in Dionisio, that a gran subpoena is not a "seizure" within the mean the Fourth Amendment and, further, that that A ment is not violated by a grand jury directive pelling production of "physical characteristics are "constantly exposed to the public." Ante, at 14. Handwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown public, and there is no more expectation of priv the physical characteristics of a person's scrip there is in the tone of his voice. See United St Doe (Schwartz), 457 F. 2d 895, 898-899; Brad United States, 413 F. 2d 467, 471-472; cf. Gil Opinion of BRENNAN, J. California, 388 U. S. 263, 266-267. Consequen Government was under no obligation here, an than in Dionisio, to make a preliminary show "reasonableness." Indeed, this case lacks even the aspects of an ex investigation that the Court of Appeals found sig in Dionisio. In that case, 20 witnesses were sur to give exemplars; here there was only one. The and narrowly drawn directive requiring the wit furnish a specimen of his handwriting* violated n mate Fourth Amendment interest. The Distric was correct, therefore, in ordering the respon comply with the grand jury's request. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Ap reversed, and this case is remanded to that c further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part senting in part in No. 71-229, ante, p. 1, and diss No. 71-850. I agree, for the reasons stated by the Court, spondent Dionisio's Fifth Amendment claims a out merit. I dissent, however, from the Court's *The respondent contends that because he has seen 1 affidavit nor the writings in the grand jury's possession ernment may actually be seeking "testimonial" communic content as opposed to the physical characteristics of 1 But the Government's petition for the order to compel stated: "Such exemplars will be used solely as a standa parison in order to determine whether the witness is of certain writings." If the Government should seek the physical characteristics of the witness' handwriti example, it should seek to obtain written answers to in questions or a signature on an incriminating statemen course, the witness could assert his Fifth Amendment privi compulsory self-incrimination. the Court, that reent claims are withthe Court's rejection DOUGLAS, J., dissenting of the Fourth Amendment claims of Dionisio and M also without merit. I agree that no unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment is effecte grand jury subpoena limited to requiring the appe of a suspect to testify. But insofar as the subpo quires a suspect's appearance in order to obtain v handwriting exemplars from him, I conclude, su tially in agreement with Part II of my Brother SHALL'S dissent, that the reasonableness under the Amendment of such a seizure cannot simply be pre I would therefore affirm the judgments of the C Appeals reversing the contempt convictions and r with directions to the District Court to afford th ernment the opportunity to prove reasonableness the standard fashioned by the Court of Appea MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.* Judge William Campbell, who has been on th trict Court in Chicago for over 32 years, recently the following indictment against the grand jury "This great institution of the past has ceased to be the guardian of the people for purpose it was created at Runnymede. To is but a convenient tool for the prosecuto often used solely for publicity. Any expe prosecutor will admit that he can indict a at any time for almost anything before any jury." It is, indeed, common knowledge that the gran having been conceived as a bulwark between the and the Government, is now a tool of the Exe he has seen neither the 's possession, the Gov1" communications-the teristics of his writing. r to compel production as a standard of comwitness is the author should seek more than s' handwriting-if, for aswers to incriminating ag statement-then, of dment privilege against *This opinion applies also to No. 71-229, United States v. ante, p. 1. 155 F. R. D. 229, 253 (1972). DOUGLAS, J., dissenting The concession by the Court that the grand jury longer in a realistic sense "a protective bulwark st solidly between the ordinary citizen and an over prosecutor" is reason enough to affirm these judg It is not uncommon for witnesses summoned to before the grand jury at a designated room to that the room is the room of the prosecutor. Th before us today are prime examples of this per Respondent Dionisio and approximately 19 were subpoenaed by the Special February 1971 Jury for the Northern District of Illinois in an gation of illegal gambling operations. Duri investigation, the grand jury had received as voice recordings obtained under court orders, rants issued under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 authorizin taps. The witnesses were instructed to go to the States Attorney's office, with their own counsel desired, in the company of an FBI agent who h appointed as an agent of the grand jury by man, and to read the transcript of the wire inte The readings were recorded. The grand jury th pared the voices taken from the wiretap and nesses' record. Dionisio refused to make t exemplars on the ground they would violate 1 under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. T ernment filed petitions in the United States Disti for the Northern District of Illinois to compel th to furnish the exemplars to the grand jury. rejected the constitutional arguments of the ro and demanded compliance. Dionisio again re was adjudged in civil contempt and placed until he obeyed the court order or until the te special grand jury expired. The Court of A versed, concluding that to compel complian violate his Fourth Amendment rights. It held exemplars are protected by the Constitution |