2 410 U. S. cannot accept that we said that the ection for what "a ic, even in his own 351. The physical one and manner, as conversation, are ke a man's facial Dice is repeatedly n can have a reat know the sound reasonably expect e world. As the uit stated: hooses to live his Lily lives we cone the content of urth Amendment entifying charachout both public open for all to r constructing a jury which does Hence rangers. acy results from or voice exemthe grand jury d to the public Schwartz), 457 voice is thus Fourth Amendinto the body merber. "The 1 1 Opinion of the Court interests in human dignity and privacy which the Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions mere chance that desired evidence might be obta Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S., at 769-770. ilarly, a seizure of voice exemplars does not invol "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished pe security," effected by the "patdown" in Terry "sur an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humi experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 24-25. E this is like the fingerprinting in Davis, where, thou initial dragnet detentions were constitutionally missible, we noted that the fingerprinting itself "in none of the probing into an individual's private 15 thoughts that marks an interrogation or search." v. Mississippi, 394 U. S., at 727; cf. Thom v. Nev Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1009. Since neither the summons to appear before the jury nor its directive to make a voice recording in upon any interest protected by the Fourth A ment, there was no justification for requiring the jury to satisfy even the minimal requirement o sonableness" imposed by the Court of Appeals. United States v. Doe (Schwartz), supra, at 89 A grand jury has broad investigative powers to mine whether a crime has been committed and w committed it. The jurors may act on tips, r evidence offered by the prosecutor, or their own p knowledge. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 70 grand jury witness is "entitled to set limits to the tigation that the grand jury may conduct." B United States, 250 U. S., at 282. And a sufficien 13 In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S., at 77, the Court fou such a standard had not been met, but as noted supra, a that was a case where the Fourth Amendment had been in by an overly broad subpoena to produce books and papers. for an indictment may only emerge at the end investigation when all the evidence has been re "It is impossible to conceive that examination of witnesses must be stopped basis is laid by an indictment formally pre when the very object of the examination is to tain who shall be indicted." Hale v. Henk U. S., at 65. Since Dionisio raised no valid Fourth Amer claim, there is no more reason to require a preli showing of reasonableness here than there wo in the case of any witness who, despite the lack constitutional or statutory privilege, declined to a question or comply with a grand jury request. the Constitution nor our prior cases justify ar interference with grand jury proceedings.14 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no may be brought to trial for an infamous crime on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury constitutional guarantee presupposes an inves body "acting independently of either prosecutin ney or judge," Stirone v. United States, 361 U 218, whose mission is to clear the innocent, no 1 14 MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, in dissent, post, p. 31, sugge preliminary showing of "reasonableness" is required where jury subpoenas a witness to appear and produce handwritin exemplars, but not when it subpoenas him to appear a Such a distinction finds no support in the Constitution. 1 argues that there is a potential Fourth Amendment viola case of a subpoenaed grand jury witness because of the a trusiveness of the initial subpoena to appear-the possi from a grand jury appearance and the inconvenience of restraint. But the initial directive to appear is as intru witness is called simply to testify as it is if he is summoned physical evidence. ourth Amendment quire a preliminary n there would be ite the lack of any declined to answer y request. Neither s justify any such ings." s that no civilian nous crime "unless Grand Jury." This s an investigative prosecuting attortes, 361 U. S. 212. nocent, no less than , p. 31, suggests that a quired where the grand ce handwriting or voice to appear and testify. nstitution. His dissent adment violation in the ause of the asserted inar-the possible stigma nvenience of the official ar is as intrusive if the is summoned to produce to bring to trial those who may be guilty. 15 Any P that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials an liminary showings would assuredly impede its i gation and frustrate the public's interest i fair and expeditious administration of the crimina Cf. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530, 53 Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 363-364 bledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 327 The grand jury may not always serve its histor as a protective bulwark standing solidly betwe ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor, b is even to approach the proper performance of i stitutional mission, it must be free to pursue its inv tions unhindered by external influence or supe 15 "[T]he institution was adopted in this country, and is c from considerations similar to those which give to it its ch in England, and is designed as a means, not only of bringing persons accused of public offences upon just grounds, but a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded ac whether it comes from government, or be prompted by passion or private enmity. No person shall be required, ing to the fundamental law of the country, except in t mentioned, to answer for any of the higher crimes unless th consisting of not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-th and lawful men, selected from the body of the district, shall upon careful deliberation, under the solemnity of an oa there is good reason for his accusation and trial." Ex par 121 U. S. 1, 11 (quoting grand jury charge of Mr. Justic See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 390. 16 The possibilities for delay caused by requiring initial of "reasonableness" are illustrated by the Court of Appeal quent decision in In re September 1971 Grand Jury, 454 F rev'd sub nom. United States v. Mara, post, p. 19, w Court held that the Government was required to shov adversary hearing that its request for exemplars was rea and "reasonableness" included proof that the exemplars c be obtained from other sources. Opinion of the Court so long as it does not trench upon the legitimate of any witness called before it. Since the Court of Appeals found an unreas search and seizure where none existed, and imp preliminary showing of reasonableness where nor required, its judgment is reversed and this case manded to that court for further proceedings con with this opinion. It is so o [For separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENN post, p. 22.] [For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGL post, p. 23.] [For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHA post, p. 31.] 2 410 U. S. e legitimate rights dan unreasonable ed, and imposed a s where none was ad this case is receedings consistent It is so ordered. ICE BRENNAN, see STICE DOUGLAS, see ICE MARSHALL, See Syllabus UNITED STATES v. MARA, AKA MARASC CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEA No. 71-850. Argued November 6, 1972-Decided January Respondent, subpoenaed to furnish handwriting exemplars to a grand jury to determine whether he was the author of writings, was held in contempt after refusing complian District Court having rejected respondent's contention th compelled production would constitute an unreasonable and seizure. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding t Fourth Amendment applied and that the Government make a preliminary showing of reasonableness. Held: The and narrowly drawn directive to furnish a handwriting sp which, like the compelled speech disclosure upheld in Unite v. Dionisio, ante, p. 1, involved production of physica acteristics, violated no legitimate Fourth Amendment Pp. 21-22. 454 F. 2d 580, reversed and remanded. STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ. DOUGLAS, J., post, p. 23, BRENNAN, J., post, p. 22, and MAL J., post, p. 31, filed dissenting opinions. Philip A. Lacovara argued the cause for the States. On the brief were Solicitor General Gri Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Wm. Br Reynolds, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney M. Glo Angelo Ruggiero argued the cause and filed a br respondent. Phylis Skloot Bamberger argued the cause fo Federal Community Defender Organization of the Aid Society of New York as amicus curiae urging a With her on the brief was William E. Helle ance. |