113 use of the pseudonym, no is a fictitious person. For ept as true, and as estabgnant state, as of the incep970 and as late as May 21 an alias affidavit with the lity to obtain a legal abor the time of its filing and May, there can be little la case or controversy and e class aspects, she, as a ted by the Texas criminal o challenge those statutes. 1121, 1125 (CA2 1971); F. 2d 833, 838-839 (CA6 9 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). appellee's brief as really trary. The "logical nexus nd the claim sought to be ,392 U. S., at 102, and ntentiousness, Golden v. 9), are both present. ver, that the record does egnant at the time of the y 22, 1970, or on the folt's opinion and judgment hat Roe's case must now ther members of her class L 970 pregnancy. ef that the hearing before the 1970. Brief for Appellee 13. anscript, App. 76, reveal this rs to be the time of the re Opinion of the Court The usual rule in federal cases is that troversy must exist at stages of appella review, and not simply at the date the act United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 L Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v. Medfor Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972 But when, as here, pregnancy is a sig the litigation, the normal 266-day hu period is so short that the pregnancy wil before the usual appellate process is con termination makes a case moot, pregn seldom will survive much beyond the t appellate review will be effectively der should not be that rigid. Pregnancy oft than once to the same woman, and in the lation, if man is to survive, it will alwa Pregnancy provides a classic justification f of nonmootness. It truly could be "capab yet evading review." Southern Pacific 1 ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). See M 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Priv U. S. 175, 178–179 (1968); United States Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). We, therefore, agree with the District C Roe had standing to undertake this litig presented a justiciable controversy, and mination of her 1970 pregnancy has no case moot. B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's positio He entered Roe's litigation as a plair alleging in his complaint that he: "[I]n the past has been arrested the Texas Abortion Laws and at th stands charged by indictment with laws in the Criminal District Co County, Texas to-wit: (1) The Stat Opinion of the Court James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, an State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, 2524-H. In both cases the defendant with abortion...." In his application for leave to intervene, made like representations as to the abortic pending in the state court. These representa also repeated in the affidavit he executed a support of his motion for summary judgme Dr. Hallford is, therefore, in the position in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive respect to the same statutes under which charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneou in state court. Although he stated that h arrested in the past for violating the State laws, he makes no allegation of any subs immediate threat to any federally protected cannot be asserted in his defense against the cutions. Neither is there any allegation of or bad-faith prosecution. In order to esca articulated in the cases cited in the next p this opinion that, absent harassment and 1 defendant in a pending state criminal case car tively challenge in federal court the statutes the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallfo distinguish his status as a present state def his status as a "potential future defendant": only the latter for standing purposes here. We see no merit in that distinction. Ou Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), conclusion that the District Court erred wh declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead from so doing. The court, of course, was ( fusing to grant injunctive relief to the docto sons supportive of that action, however, a pressed in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and i he executed and filed in mmary judgment. n the position of seeking, and injunctive relief with under which he stands as simultaneously pending stated that he has been ting the State's abortion of any substantial and rally protected right that se against the state proseallegation of harassment order to escape the rule the next paragraph of ment and bad faith, a nal case cannot affirmae statutes under which Dr. Hallford seeks to state defendant from endant" and to assert es here. n. Our decision in 1971), compels the ed when it granted tead of refraining was correct in reoctor. The rear, are those exd in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. La 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 8 Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U. S. 216 (1971). browski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965) passing, that Younger and its companion cided after the three-judge District Co this case. Dr. Hallford's complaint in interventic to be dismissed." He is remitted to his state criminal proceedings against him. judgment of the District Court insofar as Hallford relief and failed to dismiss hi intervention. C. The Does. In view of our ruling as ing in her case, the issue of the Does' st case has little significance. The claims essentially the same as those of Roe, and same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly posture. Their pleadings present them as a ch couple, the woman not being pregnant, desire to have children at this time becau: ing received medical advice that Mrs. Do pregnancy, and for "other highly personal they "fear they may face the prospe We need not consider what different result, if if Dr. Hallford's intervention were on behalf of a plaint in intervention does not purport to assert makes no reference to any class apart from an "and others similarly situated" must necessarily g ing of Art. 1196. His application for leave to int what further, for it asserts that plaintiff Roe does n tect the interest of the doctor "and the class o physicians... [and] the class of people who are . The leave application, however, is not the compla District Court's statement to the contrary, 314 F. fail to perceive the essentials of a class suit in the H Opinion of the Court parents." And if pregnancy ensues, they "wc to terminate" it by an abortion. They assert al to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and, con the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion t going outside Texas to some place where the could be obtained legally and competently. We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple as their asserted immediate and present injur alleged "detrimental effect upon (their) ma piness" because they are forced to "the choice ing from normal sexual relations or of endange Doe's health through a possible pregnancy." is that sometime in the future Mrs. Doe mig pregnant because of possible failure of col measures, and at that time in the future she r an abortion that might then be illegal under statutes. This very phrasing of the Does' position speculative character. Their alleged injury re sible future contraceptive failure, possible f nancy, possible future unpreparedness for and possible future impairment of health. more of these several possibilities may not and all may not combine. In the Does' estim possibilities might have some real or imagi upon their marital happiness. But we are n to say that the bare allegation of so indirect sufficient to present an actual case or Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 41-42; Golden 394 U. S., at 109-110; Abele v. Markle, at 1124-1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 日 The Does' claim falls far short of those res wise in the cases that the Does urge upon Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. Opinion of the Court and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1 Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). 113 nsues, they "would want They assert an inability Texas and, consequently, legal abortion there or of lace where the procedure competently. married couple who have, I present injury, only an on [their] marital hapto "the choice of refrainor of endangering Mary regnancy." Their claim Mrs. Doe might become ailure of contraceptive e future she might want illegal under the Texas es' position reveals its ged injury rests on pospossible future pregdness for parenthood, f health. Any one or s may not take place Does' estimation, these 1 or imagined impact t we are not prepared o indirect an injury is case or controversy. 2; Golden v. Zwickler, Markle, 452 F. 2d, lge, 446 F. 2d, at 839. those resolved otherge upon us, namely, 01 U. S. 617 (1971); 97 U. S. 150 (1970); The Does therefore are not appropria this litigation. Their complaint was pro by the District Court, and we affirm tha V The principal thrust of appellant's atta statutes is that they improperly invade be possessed by the pregnant woman, to minate her pregnancy. Appellant woul right in the concept of personal "libert the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Proce personal, marital, familial, and sexual be protected by the Bill of Rights or see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 stadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); id., J., concurring in result); or among those to the people by the Ninth Amendment, ( necticut, 381 U. S., at 486 (Goldberg, Before addressing this claim, we feel it des survey, in several aspects, the history( such insight as that history may afford examine the state purposes and intere criminal abortion laws. VI It perhaps is not generally appreciat strictive criminal abortion laws in effec of States today are of relatively recent laws, generally proscribing abortion or any time during pregnancy except whe preserve the pregnant woman's life, are or even of common-law origin. Instea from statutory changes effected, for the the latter half of the 19th century. |