113 In laws, like those involved here, that nly a life-saving procedure on the ard to the stage of her pregnancy and late the Due Process Clause of the ich protects against state action the woman's qualified right to terminate State cannot override that right, it rotecting both the pregnant woman's f human life, each of which interests ling" point at various stages of the Pp. 147-164. papproximately the end of the first In and its effectuation must be left the pregnant woman's attending based as it is on contingencies, any ot occur, is too speculative to present sy. Pp. 127-129. lent to approximately the end of in promoting its interest in the it chooses, regulate the abortion onably related to maternal health. 1 Syllabus that the Texas criminal abortion statutes are P. 166. 314 F. Supp. 1217, affirmed in part and reversed BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, POWELL, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., post, p. 2 post, p. 209, and STEWART, J., post, p. 167, filed cor WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHM post, p. 221. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opin Sarah Weddington reargued the cause With her on the briefs were Roy Lucas, Roy L. Merrill, Jr., and Norman Dorsen. Robert C. Flowers, Assistant Attorne Texas, argued the cause for appellee on th Jay Floyd, Assistant Attorney General, arg for appellee on the original argument. the brief were Crawford C. Martin, Attc Nola White, First Assistant Attorney G Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney G Wade, and John B. Tolle.* nt to viability the State, in protiality of human life, may, if it ribe, abortion except where necesment, for the preservation of the 163-164;164-165. erm "physician" to mean only a De State, and may proscribe any ot a physician as so defined. injunctive relief issue since the ly recognize the Court's ruling *Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Gary K. General of Arizona, Robert K. Killian, Attorney Ge icut, Ed W. Hancock, Attorney General of Kentuck Meyer, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Ver Attorney General of Utah; by Joseph P. Withers Association of Texas Diocesan Attorneys; by for Americans United for Life; by Eugene J Women for the Unborn et al.; by Carol Ryan can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et J. Horan, Jerome A. Frazel, Jr., Thomas M Dolores V. Horan for Certain Physicians, Professor the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecolog Pilpel, Nancy F. Wechsler, and Frederic S. Nathan enthood Federation of America, Inc., et al.; by Ale the National Legal Program on Health Problems of by Marttie L. Thompson for State Communities Opinion of the Court MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opin Court. This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia с Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, present constituti lenges to state criminal abortion legislation. statutes under attack here are typical of have been in effect in many States for appro century. The Georgia statutes, in contras modern cast and are a legislative product t extent at least, obviously reflects the influence attitudinal change, of advancing medical kno techniques, and of new thinking about an old We forthwith acknowledge our awareness o tive and emotional nature of the abortion c of the vigorous opposing views, even among and of the deep and seemingly absolute conv the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's one's exposure to the raw edges of human exis religious training, one's attitudes toward life and their values, and the moral standards one and seeks to observe, are all likely to influ color one's thinking and conclusions about : In addition, population growth, pollutic and racial overtones tend to complicate and plify the problem. Our task, of course, is to resolve the issu tutional measurement, free of emotion and of We seek earnestly to do this, and, because Alfred L. Scanlan, Martin J. Flynn, and Robert M National Right to Life Committee; by Helen L. B the American Ethical Union et al.; by Norma G. American Association of University Women et ε Stearns for New Women Lawyers et al.; by the C mittee to Legalize Abortion et al.; and by Robert Robert L. Sassone. delivered the opinion of the eal and its Georgia companion, 19, present constitutional chalortion legislation. The Texas re are typical of those that hy States for approximately a tatutes, in contrast, have a gislative product that, to an flects the influences of recent ncing medical knowledge and king about an old issue. e our awareness of the sensiof the abortion controversy, ews, even among physicians, gly absolute convictions that hilosophy, one's experiences, es of human existence, one's ades toward life and family al standards one establishes likely to influence and to plusions about abortion. rowth, pollution, poverty, omplicate and not to sim solve the issue by consti- and Robert M. Byrn for the have inquired into, and in this opinior emphasis upon, medical and medical-lega what that history reveals about man's att the abortion procedure over the centuries. mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonitio vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New Yo 45, 76 (1905): "[The Constitution) is made for peo mentally differing views, and the ac finding certain opinions natural and novel and even shocking ought not our judgment upon the question wh embodying them conflict with the C the United States." I The Texas statutes that concern us h 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal make it a crime to "procure an abortion 1 "Article 1191. Abortion "If any person shall designedly administer to a or knowingly procure to be administered with her or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence ever externally or internally applied, and thereby tion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not 1 more than five years; if it be done without her com ment shall be doubled. By 'abortion' is meant tha fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's premature birth thereof be caused. "Art. 1192. Furnishing the means "Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice. "Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion "If the means used shall fail to produce an abor is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce al it be shown that such means were calculated to pro Opinion of the Court defined, or to attempt one, except with respe abortion procured or attempted by medical : the purpose of saving the life of the mother.' statutes are in existence in a majority of the and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor mo thousand dollars. "Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion "If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abo duced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder "Art. 1196. By medical advice "Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion pro tempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving t mother." The foregoing Articles, together with Art. 1195, com 9 of Title 15 of the Penal Code. Article 1195, not a reads: "Art. 1195. Destroying unborn child "Whoever shall during parturition of the mother vitality or life in a child in a state of being born and birth, which child would otherwise have been born a confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less tha 2 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-211 (1956); Conn. Pu (May 1972 special session) (in 4 Conn. Leg. Serv. 677 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 53-29, 53-30 (1968) (or u Idaho Code § 18-601 (1948); Ill. Rev. Stat., • (1971); Ind. Code § 35-1-58-1 (1971); Iowa Code § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 436.020 (1962); La. Rev. Stat. (1964) (loss of medical license) (but see § 14:87 containing no exception for the life of the mother und statute); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 51 (1964 Laws Ann., c. 272, § 19 (1970) (using the term "un strued to exclude an abortion to save the mother's Bd. of Registration, 356 Mass. 98, 248 N. E. 2d 264 Comp. Laws § 750.14 (1948); Minn. Stat. § 617.18 (19 Stat. § 559.100 (1969); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 9 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-405 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 2 N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 585:13 (1955); N. J. Stat. (1969) ("without lawful justification"); N. D. Cent. 01, 12-25-02 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.16 Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, § 861 (1972-1973 Supp.); Pa. Sta 113 majority of the States. Opinion of the Court Texas first enacted a criminal abortion st Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, § 1, set forth in 3 Laws of Texas 1502 (1898). This was s into language that has remained substantia to the present time. See Texas Penal C c. 7. Arts. 531-536; G. Paschal, Laws of 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev. Stat., c. 8, (1879); Texas Rev. Crim. Stat., Arts. 1071 The final article in each of these compilat the same exception, as does the present Ar an abortion by "medical advice for the pur the life of the mother." 3 §§ 4718, 4719 (1963) ("unlawful"); R. I. Gen. Lav (1969); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-17-1 (1967); §§ 39-301, 39-302 (1956); Utah Code Ann. §§ (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1958); W § 61-2-8 (1966); Wis. Stat. § 940.04 (1969); Wyo. St 6-78 (1957). ne hundred nor more than one bortion to an abortion procured or at- th Art. 1195, compose Chapter n of the mother destroy the of being born and before actual have been born alive, shall be or for not less than five years." 1956); Conn. Pub. Act No. 1 an. Leg. Serv. 677 (1972)), and -30 (1968) (or unborn child); Rev. Stat., с. 38, §23-1 ); Iowa Code § 701.1 (1971); La. Rev. Stat. § 37:1285 (6) t see § 14:87 (Supp. 1972) The mother under the criminal 7, §51 (1964); Mass. Gen. The term "unlawfully," conThe mother's life, Kudish v. E. 2d 264 (1969)); Mich. § 617.18 (1971); Mo. Rev. s Ann. § 94-401 (1969); Stat. § 200.220 (1967); J. Stat. Ann. §2A:87-1 D. Cent. Code §§ 12–25– $2901.16 (1953); Okla. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 3 Long ago, a suggestion was made that the Tex unconstitutionally vague because of definitional c Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of that emptorily, saying only, "It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of judgme ute is unconstitutional and void in that it does not : or describe the offense of abortion. We do not c to this question." Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. S. W. 262, 268 (1908). The same court recently has held again that the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbr v. State (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1971), appeal docket The court held that "the State of Texas ha interest to protect fetal life"; that Art. 1191 "is de fetal life"; that the Texas homicide statutes, parti of the Penal Code, are intended to protect a person actual birth" and thereby implicitly recognize other is not "in existence by actual birth"; that the def life is for the legislature and not the courts; th more definite than the District of Columbia statute u States v.] Vuitch" (402 U. S. 62); and that the ' |