woman's right.103 Yet if courts can balance these two interests and decide in favor of the woman, why couldn't they weigh other interests-like a woman's health-in the same way. All of these interpretations are possible. They are not just minor variations or alternatives on how far the amendments will go in a single direction. They point in separate, widely divergent directions. The result is rampant uncertainty as to the impact the implementation of any of the amendments then would have. The seriousness of amending the Constitution demands more guidance and more precision from proposed amendments. IV. CONCLUSION The proposed anti-abortion amendments have two major flaws. First, they withdraw important guarantees of personal liberty. Second, at least three of them are so poorly drafted that it is impossible to know what they mean or what they will accomplish. Rewriting the amendments will not cure these defects. The first is inherent in the nature of the political purpose they are to serve. The amendments were written to circumvent two Supreme Court decisions; the only way they can accomplish this is to withdraw the constitutional guarantees of liberty on which the decisions rested. The second flaw-the poor draftingis made inescapable by the politics of enacting an amendment. The sponsors of the amendments want to stop women from getting abortions. The most direct tack, writing a criminal statute, was foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Technically, an amendment imposing criminal sanctions could be written into the Constitution, since the subject matter of a constitutional amendment is virtually limitless. Politically, however, such an amendment would never succeed. To attract serious attention the amendments had to be written in terms of protecting broad human rights. Enacting a constitutional amendment is a serious proposition. It creates uniquely powerful law and engrafts that law onto this country's fundamental legal document. The proposed constitutional amendments and probably any anti-abortion amendment are too flawed in their most basic concepts and format to justify their ratification. 104 108 Different supporters of the amendments find justification for this exception in different sources. Sen. Helms simply asserts that such a jutification would exist, Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 94-95. Prof. Robert Byrn, an active supporter of anti-abortion amendment, relies on "the doctrine of legal necessity." Statement of Prof. Robert Byrn, before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, March 10, 1975 (unpublished). Rep. Lawrence Hogan finds justification for the exception in the due process clause although he is unsure exactly how the due process clause will accomplish this. During questioning by Sen. Birch Bayh this exchange took place: "Mr. HOGAN. . . . And I am saying you could, [save the life of the mother], because all I am saying in my constitutional amendment is you must accord that other human being due process. And in the course of due process, you choose the mother's life over the child's. That is due process. . "But, wherever you give, wherever you recognize the rights of the child and weigh them against the rights of the mother, you are affording due process. "Senator BAYH. Well, that is the newest definition of due process I have ever heard. It is the first definition of due process I have seen like that. "Do you go to the court for this due process? In other words. is this the kind of due process where if the doctor decides that continuing the pregnancy will jeopardize the mother's life, then the unborn child will always loge?... How do you describe it? Due process sounds very nice, but how does it work in the hospital room? "Mr. HOGAN. The way it works is in order to get the legal right to kill this child you go to court, and the court, which is where the due process system works, weighs the respective rights and decides that the mother's life should be preserved which requires the aborting of this fetus. "Senator BAYH. In other words, in order for an abortion to be legal under your amendment, you have to go to court and get a court order? "Mr. HOGAN. Yes, just like we had to do with the case of the woman in the Jehovah's Witnesses for the blood transfusion. "Senator BAYH. Would the child be represented by a lawyer? "Mr. HOGAN. Certainly. "Senator BAYH. And suppose the lawyer wanted to appeal? "Mr. HOGAN. Certainly he can appeal it. Certainly he is entitled to appeal. "Senator BAYH. We all now are frustrated at our inability to get justice by appeal, after appeal, after appeal. So you end up with a mother dying because of the pregnancy due to the appeal situation. "Mr. HOGAN. I agree. Senator." 104 Sen. Scott, for example, attempted to write a Constitutional amendment which would meet some criticisms of the other proposed amendments. He abandoned the project because he was unable to draft what he considered a satisfactory amendment. Planned ParenthoodWorld Population: Washington Memo, (April 7, 1975) at 4. Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment Robert A. Destrot As a result of the recent congressional hearings held on proposed constitutional amendments designed to overturn the rulings of the United States Supreme Court concerning abortion, the abortion controversy has once again become a major topic of public interest. The author seeks to identify the two distinct areas of debate involved in the issue and to discuss, in particular, the central topic raised by many of the proposals-the rights of the unborn. It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half of his fellow men to be wrong . . .1 6 Abortion, the right to privacy, the right to life-these topics have been in the public eye since the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade2 and Doe v. Bolton. These decisions have not settled the abortion controversy: it continues in Congress,* in the courts, and in the media. The subject matter is complex and may be debated at many levels. However, without a focus or common ground of discussion, efforts toward resolution inexorably lead to more debate, more confusion, and ultimately, frustration and anger for the parties involved." The A.B., 1972, Miami University; J.D., 1975, Boalt Hall School of Law. author acknowledges Professor Hal Scott, now at the Harvard Law School, and Mr. Joe Feldman of Boalt Hall School of Law for their assistance in locating the materials cited in footnote 83, and Ms. Gudrun Fuchs, a visiting research scholar at Boalt Hall School of Law, for the many hours she spent translating the parts of the opinion of the West German Federal Constitutional Court found in the Appendix to this Comment. 1. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295 (1920). 2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Roe]. 3. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Doe]. 4. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, April 7, 1975, at 34, col. 1 (editorial comment). 5. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edelin, Crim. No. 81823 (Super. Ct. Suffolk County, Mass., filed Feb. 15, 1975) on appeal, No. 81823 (Ct. App. Suffolk County, Mass., filed July 1, 1975) discussed in NEWSWEEK, March 4, 1975, at 18. 6. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, March 4, 1975, at 18 (cover story). 7. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 11 (current status of abortion controversy characterized as “sellout"). 1975] ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1251 This Comment undertakes to identify and explore several areas of debate. First, it discusses the rationale and practical effect of the Supreme Court's decision to legalize abortion in Roe v. Wade (hereinafter the "access" question). The focus then shifts to a discussion of the Court's decision in Doe v. Bolton and the existence of state power to regulate the means through which abortions may be obtained. Finally, mention is made of the background, rationale, and content of proposals for reform in these areas. It is hoped that the areas of debate relevant to this controversial issue will be seen as separate issues, each requiring careful and individualized consideration. 8 I ROE V. WADE: A QUESTION OF ACCESS A. Introduction In Roe v. Wade, which involved a challenge to the Texas abortion statutes, the Court held that a woman's decision to procure an abortion is constitutionally protected and may be restricted only in the face of a compelling state interest. The majority opinion identified legitimate governmental interests in protecting the unborn and in ensuring that abortions are performed in circumstances maximizing the health and safety of the mother. These interests were then weighed against the more generalized interests of the pregnant woman." The Court's attempted accommodation of these interests was based upon a division of pregnancy into three periods, roughly equivalent to "trimesters".10 During the first trimester there was to be no interference with either the decision to abort or the means by which this decision was to be effectuated. In the Court's opinion, neither of the states' interests was so compelling as to justify any restriction upon either the personal freedom of the pregnant woman or the medical judgment of her attending physician." The Court concluded that near 8. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 1191-94, 1196 (1963). 9. The decision purported to decide the issue without predilection. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116-17. The opinions, however, do not bear out this assertion. Recurrent in both the majority and concurring opinions are both the personal opinions of the Justices and the phrases "meaningful life" and "potential life." Roe, 410 U.S. at 162, 163; Doe, 410 U.S. at 217. This is not to say, however, that the Justices did not make an attempt to subordinate their personal feelings; but if, as they correctly noted, the question was of such a nature as to be singularly inappropriate for judicial decision, it is difficult to understand why they even decided the case. Where particularly delicate policy questions are involved, the appointed judiciary may be the least qualified to speculate as to the proper resolution. A legislature, or the people themselves, would be able to rest their decision upon basic democratic principles; a judicial tribunal invoking the doctrine of judicial review would not. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAst Dangerous BRANCH (1962). 10. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. 11. Id. at 163. 1252 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1250 the onset of the second trimester, the health hazards associated with abortion were sufficiently serious to outweigh the risks of continuing the pregnancy to term. Thus, the states' interest in safeguarding the well-being of the woman led the Court to permit state regulation of abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to the protection of maternal health.12 The Court felt that subsequent to the point at which the unborn attain viability13 the states' interest in the protection of "potential life" would become compelling. During this final period of pregnancy, the state could, at its option, prohibit abortion except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.1 B. Structuring the Interests 14 By characterizing the major interests affected by a woman's decision to procure an abortion as those of the woman and the state, the Court was able to avoid the underlying conflict between fundamental personal rights-the clash between a woman's right to privacy and her unborn offspring's right to live-which lies at the heart of the abortion issue. Since the Court characterized the basic conflict as one between an individual's right to privacy in decisions regarding reproduction and a set of state-asserted interests, including a concern for “potential" life, any discussion of the primary nonmaternal1 interests involved-those 12. See Part II infra. 13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 14. "Viability" is defined as the ability of the unborn to survive outside the uterus. This stage of maturity can, under present medical technology, be reached as early as 20 weeks. See TIME, March 31, 1975, at 82 (smallest surviving infant weighed 395 grams). The Court placed viability at 28 weeks, but conceded that it may occur as early as 24 weeks. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. 15. In any decision concerning abortion, the marshalling of the interests at stake must reflect the potential effects under various results. Rather than characterizing the interests as either maternal or state-which may ignore other interests at least as important as those of the state and encourage a bias in favor of maternal interests-the interests involved are best characterized as either maternal or nonmaternal. For the woman, pregnancy represents a substantial burden, both mental and physical. Abortion is one means by which to avoid some of these problems. For the unborn, abortion is an ultimate event which terminates existence. The unborn's interest in life clearly does not depend upon the existence of a public policy concerning abortion. For the state, an anti-abortion policy may seek to protect the unborn either because of a belief that those who are incapable of protecting their own interests need the protection of the state, or for more pragmatic reasons (for example, to increase the labor force). Likewise, a pro-abortion policy might be aimed at enabling a woman to end an unwanted pregnancy, or at facilitating a state policy to limit population growth. There are other nonmaternal interests affected by a decision regarding abortion policy, the clearest of which are the interests of the father. Since Roe, however, the father's rights have been regarded as unpersuasive in comparison to the mother's decision to abort. See, e.g., Coe v. Gerstien, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), (three-judge court), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 277, aff'd in part sub nom., Poe v. Gerstien, 412 U.S. 279 (1974) (per curiam affirmance of denial of injunction against |