The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory
The central tradition of mainline economics deals with only one way of making a living: namely, producing useful goods and services. But there is another way of getting ahead-- through conflict or the "dark side"--that is by appropriating what others have produced. Logically parallel or military aggression and resistance, the dark side includes nonmilitary activities such as litigation, strikes and lockouts, takeover contests, and bureaucratic back-biting struggles. This volume brings the analysis of conflict into the mainstream of economics. Part I explores the causes, conduct, and consequences of conflict as an economic activity. Part II delves more deeply into the evolutionary sources of our capacities, physical and mental, for both conflict and cooperation.
Other editions - View all
achieved aggregate analysis anarchy assumption Axelrod behavior benevolence bioeconomic BULLY C₁ Chicken choice choose competition condition conflict contenders Contest Success Function cooperation corner solutions Cournot criminals decisiveness parameter DEFECT Defendant Dilemma dynamic economic economists effect equation evolution Evolutionarily Stable Strategy evolutionary equilibrium example F₁ fault fighting efforts Figure Gordon Tullock Hirshleifer human income increase indifference curves initial interaction interior Jack Hirshleifer Journal litigation efforts Matrix mixed strategies move mutation Nash Nash equilibrium Nash-Cournot nomic opponent's optimal outcome p₁ Paradox of Power parties payoff environment payoff matrix Plaintiff play player police political population positive possible Prisoners productive protocol pure strategies R₁ rational Reaction Curves reciprocity relative rent-seeking resource ratio response round-robin tournament selection self-interested selfish side simultaneous-move Smith social Sociobiology solution solution concept Stackelberg struggle symmetrical Tender Trap theory tion TIT-FOR-TAT trajectories versus vertex