Plato's EthicsThis exceptional book examines and explains Plato's answer to the normative question, "How ought we to live?" It discusses Plato's conception of the virtues; his views about the connection between the virtues and happiness; and the account of reason, desire, and motivation that underlies his arguments about the virtues. Plato's answer to the epistemological question, "How can we know how we ought to live?" is also discussed. His views on knowledge, belief, and inquiry, and his theory of Forms, are examined, insofar as they are relevant to his ethical view. Terence Irwin traces the development of Plato's moral philosophy, from the Socratic dialogues to its fullest exposition in the Republic. Plato's Ethics discusses Plato's reasons for abandoning or modifying some aspects of Socratic ethics, and for believing that he preserves Socrates' essential insights. A brief and selective discussion of the Statesmen, Philebus, and Laws is included. Replacing Irwin's earlier Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), this book gives a clearer and fuller account of the main questions and discusses some recent controversies in the interpretation of Plato's ethics. It does not presuppose any knowledge of Greek or any extensive knowledge of Plato. |
Contents
| 3 | |
| 17 | |
3 Socrates Arguments about the Virtues | 31 |
From Happiness to Virtue | 52 |
5 Difficulties for Socrates | 65 |
6 The Protagoras | 78 |
7 The Argument of the Gorgias | 95 |
8 Implications of the Gorgias | 111 |
The Virtues | 223 |
Justice and Happiness | 244 |
16 Republic VVII | 262 |
17 Republic VIIIIX on Justice | 281 |
18 Platonic Love | 298 |
19 Pleasure Intelligence and the Good | 318 |
20 Reason and Virtue | 339 |
Notes | 355 |
The Meno | 127 |
10 The Theory of Forms | 148 |
11 Republic I | 169 |
Objections to Justice | 181 |
The Division of the Soul | 203 |
References | 393 |
Index Locorum | 407 |
Index Nominum | 419 |
General Index | 423 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accept Adeimantus agent agree answer appeal appetitive argument Aristotle Aristotle's assumes assumptions attitude Book brave bravery c-justice Callicles Cephalus chap Charmides choose conception of happiness concern conclusion conflict connexion contrast correct belief craft Crito defend demand desires discussion distinction early dialogues elenchos epistemological eros ethical Euthydemus Euthyphro explain Glaucon Gorgias hedonism hedonist Hippias Minor identify incontinence injustice inquiry insofar instrumental interlocutors knowledge Laches means moral Nicias non-instrumental non-rational objection p-just Phaedo Philebus philosophers Plato suggests Plato's view pleasure Polemarchus Polus principles propagation properties Protagoras psychological eudaemonism question rational recognize reference rejects relevant rely remarks Republic Republic Plato requires sake seems sensible shame sight-lovers simply Socrates claims Socrates suggests Socratic definition Socratic dialogues Socratic method someone sort soul sufficient for happiness suppose temperance things Thrasymachus tion true belief understand Unity Thesis unjust action unjust person virtue virtuous Vlastos wisdom
Popular passages
Page 185 - ... benefit. He does not therein deny that there be covenants, and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept, and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice; but he questioneth whether injustice, taking away the fear of God, for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God, may not sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good...
Page 185 - He does not therein deny that there be covenants, and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept, and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice ; but he questioneth whether injustice, taking away the fear of God, for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God, may not sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then when it conduceth to such a benefit as shall put a man in a condition to neglect...
Page 380 - And thus a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands, (pp.
Page xix - JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies JP Journal of Philosophy...
Page 71 - This person has a type of intelligence that is "a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being.
Page 71 - The remaining possibility, then, is that intelligence is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a human being. For production has its end beyond it; but action does not, since its end is doing well itself, <and doing well is the concern of intelligence>.
Page 179 - And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul? That has been admitted. Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill? That is what your argument proves. And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy? Certainly. Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?
Page 72 - ... sort — not, eg, the supposition that the triangle does or does not have two right angles — but suppositions about what is done in action. For the origin of what is done in action is the goal it aims at; and if pleasure or pain has corrupted someone, it follows that the origin will not appear to him. Hence it will not be apparent that this must be the goal and 20 cause of all his choice and action; for vice corrupts the origin.
Page 207 - Facts about rulers qua rulers and doctors qua doctors do not show that there are any actual rulers who do not make mistakes or doctors who do not make money. Similarly, facts about thirst as such do not show that any of our actual desires is a desire for drink as opposed to drink qua good.